Introduction
Let me expose a possible, albeit partial, explanation of the current stagnation and of the previous crisis and crash. It is common knowledge that the 2007 crash is of financial origin, generally imputed to speculation without regulation and/or to the inevitable eventual failure of otherwise self-fulfilling expectations: surely, there must be more to it. I will not provide statistical proof, if any, mainly because the stage of this research is one of proposing hypotheses, not yet that of supplying the needed factual support. Logic mistakes are likely, but my purpose is to stimulate research by others, if this is deemed useful. In the following I have in mind events in the US and the UK, and to a lesser extent continental Europe (perhaps Japan) -the argument is restricted to something that looks like a closed economy; and, in effect, if a China was not there, I don't know what part of the following could stand.
Wealth and Income
One aspect of the crisis, related to the long period preceding it, is the fact that households (as well as enterprises) were able to transform the increase in their wealth, derived from ever rising stock and residential market values, into new revenue: either by speculating on their assets or by increasing their debt or both, in boom times. Wealth is a stock while income is a flow: but when wealth market values increase regularly, wealth becomes a flow -we may call this the macroeconomics of leverage. When households see this flow rising, they consider it income and shall increase their consumption: they do not need to increase their savings, as their wealth continues to increase. This is the new element that the crisis has brought out. Also, and more in line with what we already know, when enterprises see their wealth flow rising, they consider it as new revenue and will increase both their investment and their current expenditures, because whatever liquidity constraint prevailed beforehand, it is now removed by the increase in their wealth. Banks and financial intermediaries do not need to worry about the confusion between income and wealth, because effective demand rises, employment and GDP grow, the profitability of enterprises increases, and creditworthiness at large is not endangered. When employment grows, so will household incomes (over and above the transformed wealth) as well as their expenditures -again, their savings will not increase, because its propensity (either precautionary or speculative) is stifled by the increase in wealth. Furthermore, as soon as employment booms, home buying increases and, with it, home values, making everybody richer (including firms, whose propensity to invest is enhanced by the increase in the value of stocks and houses). One might think that these circumstances are occasional, that the crisis is a one-shot event, that therefore it does not entail a fatal disruption in the well established economic theory, based on automatic market correction. As we shall see, this is not so.
As far as I know, the macroeconomics of leverage has not been dealt with sufficiently in economic theory (with the possible historic exceptions of Hilferding, Galbraith and Minsky) and I would like to alley all fears that the leverage effect here described has any relationship with the Pigou effect, or the real balance effect (well criticized by both Keynes and Kalecki). Our wealth, here, is unaffected by deflation and its value increases only due to speculation on the capital markets.
Income distribution
In this gargantuan (i.e. milk and honey) picture, one fact stands out: the distribution of income worsens. This is a strange outcome, given the increase in employment and, possibly, a tighter labour market. In fact, all incomes increase, but the upper deciles increase more then the lower ones: a typical Pareto improvement with worsening distribution. There are many reasons for this long term trend, and many derive from increased competition in the labour market: growing female participation, immigration, liberalisation in public services, policies of flexicurity. In all these cases, as GDP and labour demand grow, more labour supply is made available, and lesser unit wages are paid (or slower growth in wages is experienced).There are also reasons for some increase in the workers' bargaining power: while in the service sector labour mobility is high, professional skills are in greater demand than in industry. However, skill is an individual quality, and when the supply of skill increases, competition among professionals takes place.
All the elements that induce a weakening of the bargaining power of workers are in fact present before the crisis, but we have not established a link between the financial crash and labour weakness. Galbraith proposed a simple way to explain this phenomenon before the Great Depression: speculation benefits those that own capital, and during the boom distribution works against those that only earn a wage. This is more a description than an explanation, because it does not account for the decline in the bargaining power as the economy booms. In addition, if everyone owns some amount of capital, Galbraith's description does not square with the 2007 crash.
I propose, instead, that income distribution is linked to the transformation of wealth into income: for workers, the increase in wage income is less needed, when the increase of wealth income takes place; at the same time enterprises will face a lower level of conflict with their workers for the distribution of productivity gains, and inequality increases even in full employment conditions. Perhaps, this phenomenon can even induce a cultural change, if workers perceive themselves as "human capitalists" or, simply, "rich".
The crash
Our story can now resume. The less wages rise vis-à-vis the value of the workers' wealth (their home, in general), the more they must increase their debt so as to maintain their relative standard of living. Conventional wisdom has it that whatever the generosity of the financial sector, there is always some limiting risk beyond which each household (and each firm) cannot hope to continue borrowing: an argument that can never identify where the borrowing barrier precisely stands. Rather, each historic boom shows a financial industry bent on increasing liquidity by diluting the risk of bad debts, through the concoction of ever new securities reflecting some average risk, rather than the risk of any specific asset.
The existence of a boom barrier is possible, but looks like Talete's run -so much so that no rational expectation can find it. The crash, then, must be attributed to more substantial causes. A preferable explanation has to do with the economics of leverage in a context of worsening income distribution. Normally, we would argue that, when the households that could potentially buy somebody else's foreclosed property become less numerous, because their wages do not rise sufficiently to leverage the debt needed to buy that property, house prices tumble and the downturn in the financial markets begins. When this happens, however, we meet the barrier discussed earlier, and which we found unsatisfactory: further reasoning is needed.
In the boom circumstances, wealth begets wealth, until wealth market values rise: this is what can be defined as leverage. Households, however, with wages that increase less than productivity and less than GDP, must finance their consumption via new debt, based on the increased value of their homes. If so, since they use part of their wealth for consumption, they can only use part of it as leverage to acquire new property: for them wealth does not fully beget wealth. Thus, when households cannot any longer buy in the housing (or in the capital) markets, stock indices stop rising or decline. Similarly, as soon as the markets start dwindling, also firms will see their wealth decrease and this implies a reduction in leverage and in perceived revenues. As revenues of all kinds slow down or simply cease to increase, effective demand decreases or ceases to increase and the multiplier works negatively: an economic crisis, and not simply a financial one, sets in.
Economic policies and the crash It is not "normal" that a stock becomes a flow, and we have to figure out what has caused the transformation of wealth into income. I think that what has helped the transformation has been a series of policies that, since the early '80s, disregarded any consideration for keeping effective demand nearer potential output: either because a self equilibrating "natural rate of growth" theory was used for policy purposes or, more simply, because it was believed that supply creates its own demand. Simplifying, the following appear the tenets of the new policies:
• if a depression sets in, then labour becomes cheaper, firms' expected real incomes increase, and their demand grows, restoring equilibrium. If this does not work, and will not work because the downturn in wages reduces the volume of sales, then • deregulation will: the transaction costs for the economy as a whole will decline, real incomes increase, and equilibrium is restored. If deregulation does not work, and will not work because the decline in transaction costs is tantamount to a decline in employment, wages and sales, then • labour market flexibility will: removing wage earners rents, due to labour rigidities, will raise firms' expected incomes and profits, restoring equilibrium: a non-event, because realized profits will not increase since demand out of wages declines (or fails to rise).
All these instances are based on a well known fallacy: if costs of production are reduced, then demand is assumed to pick up because prices should go down (here we see the real balance effect); but if the expenditure on inputs decline, then whoever supplies the inputs will face lower sales, profits and incomes. The microeconomic foundation of macroeconomics fails.
It is this failure in recognising the role of effective demand the proximate cause for deregulation (liberalisation) policies in the financial markets: if regulation on limiting the risks in the trade of securities is relaxed, the market will provide risky paper, but will need to show that such paper can be used to leverage other paper -as shown before -producing real effects. Among the deregulation cases, possibly the most important is the independence of the central bank: a new policy occasioned by the monetarist revival of the late 70s and early 80s. Such independence reduces the sovereignty of governments in issuing fiduciary money: central banks are not obliged to buy government paper to cover public deficits and governments will have to sell their bonds on the market. Since bond supply increases, crowding the market, interest rates rise, public deficits and debts grow and this makes it more difficult for the government to provide effective demandprecisely the objective of this policy.
When, in the face of their basic tenets, governments found that economic activity was to be sustained, and since their economic policies did not include acting on demand, further deregulation was enacted, and this changed the role of the central bank and of the banking system in regulating money supply. Now nobody really controls bank money, and banks lend on the basis of their own wealth: each bank is therefore pushed to create its own wealth, by buying securities which can reduce the risk of underlying assets (as shown before) and selling (forging, sometimes) securities bearing uncertainty and incalculable risks, thus increasing their own leveraging power: speculation has finally found a true leader. As seen above, speculation does have real effects: the greater financial agility, by easing the issuing of purely "fiduciary" securities (a form of endogenous money), produces wealth, leverage and effective demand -at least until the worsening distribution of income causes a market crash.
This story has a moral: by reducing the role of the State, through deregulation, no economic policy aiming at preserving full employment is feasible, with the exception of letting speculative markets grow; and the more speculative they are, the more they have an effect on demand. Such effect can be sustained, however, only if the distribution of income improves: any gain in the capital and housing markets is to be considered as an increase in overall productivity and, thus, distributed to all the workers in the economy, not only to those that operate in the financial or housing sectors. But since workers have in the meantime lost their bargaining power and the awareness of their real status, such redistributive policy will not take place. If, as a reaction to the crash new regulation will really discipline capital markets, then there is no possibility for speculation to raise effective demand, and for growth to resume. The economies are at a dead end: if they don't regulate, a crash is likely, if they regulate, growth is stifled.
Leverage and the consumption function I hope that all this reasoning stands up. The inspiration is certainly keynesian: as witnessed by the stress on effective demand, on the central bank as the last resort for financing government deficits, on income distribution. The difference is on speculation and wealth, because while Keynes thought that buying and selling existing securities has no real effects and wealth and income are separate, in my view speculation has indeed real effects. This is not a small change in the keynesian model: following a suggestion of Professor De Cecco, it implies that the consumption function is not only based on income, but also on leverage. This does not mean, however, that the rate of interest is called into the function, and therefore neither Modigliani's life cycle nor Friedman's permanent income hypotheses are relevant. Leverage is not dependent on the rate of interest, but on the deregulation of capital markets. To make this statement clearer, the financial market may show a pseudo Pigou effect, if speculation is enhanced by lower interest rates which cause an increase in wealth, but one would need an ever decreasing interest rate to produce ever increasing wealth. Instead, given the rate of interest, it is the rise in stock market indices which generates first new wealth and new incomes and finally their demise.
